One of the main challenges in security today is defending against malware attacks. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their indiscriminate or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organizations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, several approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the command and control (C&C) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller.
INTRODUCTION
In this survey, we focus on the evasion resilience of the machine learning (ML) component(s) of command and control (C&C) detection systems. Malware detection and mitigation is an established problem. In the past several years, the number of attacks, their sophistication, and potential impact have grown substantially. Indiscriminate attacks have continued to flourish: these attacks are financially motivated, are responsible for the compromise of large numbers of machines, and result in the theft of financial data, such as credit card numbers and online banking account credentials [Franklin et al. 2007 ], or are used in carrying out attacks including distributed denial of service
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-We identify open research challenges in the use of ML for C&C detection (Section 7.6).
THE C&C DETECTION PROBLEM

Malware Phases
Today, malware attacks are both indiscriminate (in the form of botnets) and targeted, evasive, and aimed at obtaining and exfiltrating sensitive data from specific individuals or organizations. How are these attacks carried out in practice? Although the specific attack steps and their naming may vary across publications, the literature agrees on the general structure of malware attacks, which is commonly represented as a sequence of steps similar to those of Figure 1 .
The C&C phase is where the adversaries leverage the compromise of a system. More precisely, compromised systems are forced to establish a communication channel back to the adversary through which they can be directly controlled. The C&C channel enables an attacker to establish a "hands-on-keyboard" presence on the infected system (via so-called remote access tools), to install additional specialized malware modules, and to perform additional malicious actions (e.g., spread to other machines or start a denial-of-service attack). This channel can either be centralized with a single (or small set of) control server access by the malware or decentralized in a peer-to-peer botnet where there is no central server present.
Focus of This Article
In this survey, we focus on the evasion resilience of the ML component(s) of C&C detection systems. Note that although we focus on the C&C phase, the data exfiltration stage uses many of the same channels as the C&C stage, so detection systems often cover both phases.
C&C detection systems are distinct from host-based detection systems. A C&C detection system will usually operate at a network gateway, where network traffic is collected, rather than on a per-host basis. The detection problem is particularly challenging due to the vast amount of legitimate network traffic generated by normal network use (in a medium to large organization, this could easily reach terabytes a day). In the case of targeted malware attacks, the C&C traffic may only represent a minute percentage of the total traffic volume.
A further issue, particularly in the case of targeted attacks, is the desire of the attacker to remain undetected. Although indiscriminate attacks (e.g., botnets) are relatively difficult to hide in the general case, it can be assumed that the well-motivated targeted attacker will put effort into evading the particular detection methods in use.
A common feature of almost all C&C detection systems is the ML component used to make decisions about packets, or hosts, through the use of classifying or clustering techniques. Although detection systems do not purely consist of an ML algorithm, it is one of the core components. It may not be possible for an attacker to evade the other stages of detection (as discussed in Section 3), so the logical next step is to attack the core ML component. However, in the research describing the design of such detection systems, there is little, if any, consideration given to the security of the ML component. Meanwhile, there is an increasing volume of literature describing attacks against the ML algorithms used in these systems. The attacks are often described in the nonspecific scenario; however, many of the attacks could be transferable to the C&C case.
GENERALIZED ARCHITECTURE FOR C&C DETECTION
We now present a generalized architecture for a typical C&C detection system, shown in Figure 2 , and give a brief description of each component. This is a representation of a deployed system, where any training phases have already occurred.
Architecture
Data generators (A). The data generators represent the entities that produce the data evaluated by the detection system. These may take many forms. In the most common case, these will be individual hosts within a network that generate traffic, which may be assumed to be producing both malicious and benign data points. The data generators could also be honeynets or sandboxes, running malware in a controlled condition to extract its behavior. In a large network, there could be tens or hundreds of thousands of data generators.
Data aggregator (B)
. The data aggregator collects data from the individual data generators into a single stream. The aggregator could be a network monitor on the edge of a large network or on the ISP. Depending on the size of the monitored network, the aggregator may be hierarchical and be made up of different levels of aggregators at different vantage points. The aggregator could be the monitor around the honeynet/sandbox. It could also be covering external services, such as DNS.
A data aggregator will usually apply the first round of filtering on the data. The major round of processing will be the removal of unwanted data. The unwanted data will be anything not needed for detection and will typically be components such as the payload of packets. For example, if the aggregator is a traffic monitor, the monitor will often output the data as netflow records and may apply sampling (sFlow) to control the amount of data collected due to storage/processing limitations.
It is important to note that the aggregator is outside of the detection system. The aggregator may be serving multiple detection systems, as well as network monitoring tools, simultaneously, and as such, they will be configured accordingly.
Preprocessing (C). The preprocessing step represents any processing of the data before the data goes through the feature extraction step. This could take many forms, such as removing data that is not useful for detection from packet data.
Feature extraction (D). This step extracts the features required for the ML component from the data to convert the processed data into a format that can be used by the selected algorithm. The features that are extracted are a design choice of the system, chosen to maximize the detection accuracy.
Optional: Data reduction (E)
. Some systems will often make use of extra steps to reduce the size of the data and remove possible false positives (FPs). There are many techniques for doing this, but the most common are the use of whitelists to remove known benign data points, blacklists to remove known malicious points (e.g., malicious domains), or a simple signature-based filter to remove known and easy-to-detect malware.
Separation module (F) . The separation module is the key component of the detection system and is responsible for separating the input data points into a minimum of the broad classes of "benign" and "malicious." In many systems, this goes further by splitting the two into finer categories, such as matching a malicious data point to a specific malware variant.
The separation module can take many forms. In some cases, it may simply be an anomaly detector that identifies unusual behavior compared to past behavior. In the majority of cases, it will be some form of ML algorithm, either supervised or unsupervised. For example, a supervised approach will use labeled data or signatures to assign categories to the new data points, whereas in the unsupervised approach, clustering would be applied to separate the data. The separation module may apply multiple ML algorithms in multiple stages to achieve its goal.
If a classifier is in use, the classifier would have been trained using a labeled set of data before deployment. If an online clustering algorithm is in use, this module will include already clustered data to which the new point is added.
Past knowledge (G). The past knowledge component is used for supervised approaches and represents the existing information that is fed into the system to classify the new data. In the case of an anomaly detection algorithm, the past knowledge would be previous behavior that can be used for comparison purposes. If a classifier is used for the separation module, this could be a labeled dataset used to train the classifier or a set of signatures. If a clustering algorithm is used, this past knowledge can be used to identify malicious and benign clusters.
Output (H). The system will usually, at the highest level, output two sets of points: malicious and benign. However, in many cases, the separation will be more fine grain, with data points assigned more specific classes (e.g., malware variant) in the supervised example or groups of similar data points in the unsupervised example. In some cases, particularly in the case of an intrusion detection system (IDS), alerts will be output that identify hosts/entities that need to be investigated. These alerts may include extra information to assist network administrators in their investigations.
REVIEW OF CURRENT C&C DETECTION APPROACHES
Given the range of C&C design techniques, there is much interest in the design of techniques to localize C&C communication traffic by exploiting its special nature. C&C detection falls broadly into three categories: signature based, classifier based, and clustering based. Signature-based detection systems attempt to recognize known patterns of behavior in new behavior, classifiers attempt to label samples using a model trained on past data, and clustering-based detection methods attempt to divide the malicious behavior from the legitimate through statistical means.
We do not go into explicit discussion about C&C techniques in this survey; however, we refer the reader to for a survey on C&C techniques, including all of those mentioned in this section.
Evaluation Criteria
There are two primary measures of the success of a C&C detection system: the true positive (TP) rate and the FP rate. The TP rate measures the percentage of malicious samples that are labeled correctly as malware, whereas the FP rate measures the number of legitimate samples that are incorrectly labeled as malware. Of course, there are other metrics used to evaluate ML; however, the TP and FP rates are the most commonly provided among C&C detection literature, and thus we use these for comparison purposes. We also link the detection systems with the attacks against ML algorithms presented in Section 6.
Measurement and Data Collection
When detecting malware C&C, the selection of which data to collect and analyze is extremely important. For example, various detection methods require different levels of detail in the data. As networks scale, it will become progressively challenging to store all traffic-a requirement of most enterprise C&C detection techniques. Thus, if C&C traffic traces go unrecorded, then detection systems cannot work. Some techniques have been proposed to overcome the scalability limitations by developing sampling techniques; however, they do so without considering evasion resilience requirements. In addition, little attention has been paid to tuning measurement in response to C&C evasion.
Effective monitoring and data collection are crucial for detection techniques. Traffic monitoring is performed by routers, commonly using the Netflow [Cisco Systems Inc. 2016] feature or the sFlow feature. Alternatively, stand-alone measurement devices observing traffic via network mirroring devices or splitters (optical or electrical) are more flexible than in-router methods [Cranor et al. 2003 ]. In both cases, traffic traces are exported to collectors that store the traces.
There are monitoring systems that claim to be able to store all of the data. This will be affected by scalability issues. Even if all of the data can be stored (which is not guaranteed on larger networks), the processing of the data (e.g., applying an C&C detection technique) is far less scalable and will almost certainly encounter issues on a large system.
Signature-Based Methods
In signature-based detection methods, malware C&C is detected by looking for known patterns of behavior. Signatures are generated for known malware samples, then new traffic is compared to these signatures [Jacob et al. 2011] .
Signatures are generated by analyzing confirmed C&C traffic collected from various sources. The primary sources are honeynets and sandboxes. Malware is run in controlled conditions, and its activity is recorded. Most aspects of the malware's network behavior can be included in a signature, from statistical properties such as flow sizes to detailed information such as packet contents.
4.3.1. Communication Pattern Detection. Malware variants often have very particular protocols when it comes to communication. These are often noticeably different compared to legitimate traffic, both in packet contents and in the behavior of the communication. This makes signature-based detection methods very good for detecting known variants of malware. Many different pieces of malware may also be based on a common component, meaning that a single signature can be used to detect multiple pieces of similar malware. A popular method for detection is to produce signatures based on the contents of packets. It is often the case that packets of data involved in the C&C of malware will be almost identical across multiple hosts. Even though some malware families use encryption in their communications, that encryption is usually a simple, lightweight algorithm (as the encryption is often for obscurity rather than security), so there are similarities among different ciphertexts. For example, in the work of Rieck et al. [2010] , n-gram-based signatures are generated for the payloads of malware that is run under controlled conditions in a sandbox. Signatures are also generated for legitimate traffic, and with this method the system can achieve detection rates of close to 95%, with an FP rate of close to zero when running on a network gateway. Rossow and Dietrich [2013] extend this idea by providing a system for handling encrypted C&C channels. They leverage the fact that many malware variants use hard-coded, simple keys, and thus they extract these keys through reverse engineering and attempt to decrypt all packets before pattern matching is applied. Zand et al. [2014] propose a system for automatically generating text-based signatures for botnet detection. The system works by extracting common strings from observed traffic, then ranking the collected strings by first clustering network traces, and then calculating the information gain for each string based on the entropy of its appearance in clusters. The highly ranked strings can then be used for generating signatures. The system is tested on traffic collected from 1.4 million malware samples. After manually analyzing the top 100 strings, the system found 29 good signatures, 41 signatures for benign traffic, and 30 unknown, which is an improvement on previous work [Kim and Karp 2004] .
Further, Rafique and Caballero [2013] proposed a system for large-scale automatic signature generation (ASG). The system uses network traces collected from sandboxes and produces signatures for groups of similar malware, covering numerous protocols. This system is able to identify numerous malware examples with a high TP rate and experiences a low FP rate due to the specificness of the signatures generated. The signatures are designed to be exported to IDSs such as Snort for use in online detection.
BotHunter [Gu et al. 2007 ] is a system for identifying compromised hosts based on the actions that they perform, more specifically the pattern of infection and initial connection to a C&C server. There are five steps to this pattern: inbound scan, inbound exploit, binary download, outbound C&C communication, and outbound infection scanning (for propagation). These steps are identified as being a good generalization of the typical infection model for a botnet. Detection is performed by looking for combinations of these actions within a certain time period. Tested on a live campus network, the system is able to achieve a 95% TP rate and low FP rate.
DNS Traffic Analysis.
There has been a large amount of work attempting to provide a detection mechanism that can identify domains associated with malware at the DNS level. As we have seen, DNS is used by a large amount of malware that makes use of a centralized C&C structure. Nelms et al. [2013] propose ExecScent, a system for identifying malicious domains within network traffic. The system uses traces of known malware samples to create signatures. The signatures are not only based on domains but also the full HTTP requests associated with them. This system is unique, however, in that to reduce FPs, the signatures are tailored to the network on which they will be used, based on the background network traffic. This accounts for the variance in the behavior on different networks.
4.3.3. Malicious Server Detection. A slightly different approach is to attempt to detect the servers used for C&C directly. One approach for this is to use probing. propose CyberProbe, a system for automatically generating signatures for malware families by collecting traffic within a honeynets (and collecting data from public sources), clustering the traffic, and creating a set of signatures for each cluster. The signatures are used to create probes. The system then probes IPs and matches the responses to signatures to identify malicious servers. The system is extremely scalable and can perform a scan of the whole IPv4 address space. provide a follow-up piece of work that creates the signatures by applying dynamic binary analysis to malware samples. This has the benefit that signatures can be extracted without a working server (a limitation of network trace-based approaches). Both of these approaches were successful in identifying multiple new servers for certain malware families, with 0% FP rates.
Classifier-Based Methods
Like signature-based methods, classifier-based methods use past observations to assign labels to new samples. A classifier is trained using a dataset of labeled data with each point represented by a set of features. The labels for each data point in the dataset are known, making this an example of supervised learning.
The training data can be collected from many sources. Again, malicious data can be collected from honeypots and sandboxes, or they could be collected from actual traffic that has been identified as malicious. Legitimate data is often collected from live network traffic that has any known maliciousness removed, or it can be taken from known public sources. For example, sets of legitimate domains can be found by looking at the Alexa rankings.
4.4.1. Communication Pattern Detection. Rahbarinia et al. [2013] provide a two-step system for identifying hosts participating in malicious P2P behavior. First, a boosted decision tree classifier identifies hosts that exhibit any P2P behavior. Then, a two-step process identifies the P2P network to which the host belongs. A classifier is trained for each different P2P application (the actual classifier is interchangeable, although they test with the KNN, Gaussian, and Parzen classifiers), and then the host traffic is passed through all classifiers. If one classifier outputs a score above a threshold, the host is viewed as running that application. A random forest classifier is used to solve cases where two applications are matched. The first stage is able to identify P2P hosts with a TP rate of up to 90%, which can be boosted to 98.6% if the random forest classifier is used with a short time window. The effectiveness of the application classifiers varies. For example, the legitimate applications and Zeus botnet can be identified with a 90% TP rate and at most a 3% FP rate. The Storm and Waledac botnets achieve lower TP rates at 45% and 40%, respectively, but with lower FP rates. The total misclassification error is 0.68%. [Bilge et al. 2011 ] is a system for applying large-scale, passive DNS traffic analysis to identify malicious domains (not limited to those related to C&C behavior but rather those involved in any malicious behavior). The system extracts 15 features (time based, DNS based, TTL based, and domain name based). A training set is built using sources of known benign and malicious domains (Alexa ranking, blacklists, etc.) . This is then used to train the J48 classifier (an implementation of C4.5 decision trees). The system is tested on 100 billion DNS queries, using 10-fold cross validation. The system achieves detection rates of up to 98.5%, with an FP rate of around 1%. The authors state that an adversary could possibly evade the system through the use of rate-limiting DNS queries from infected hosts or by using uniform TTL values, although it is argued that these are unlikely to occur because they will lead to a drop in the performance of the malware.
DNS Traffic Analysis. EXPOSURE
Kopis [Antonakakis et al. 2011 ] makes use of the global view of the upper DNS hierarchy. In Kopis, a classifier is built that, instead of looking at the domains' IP and name, looks at the hosts that make the DNS requests. This leverages the fact that malware-related domains are likely to have an inconsistent, varied pool of requesting hosts compared to a legitimate domain that will be much more consistent. The geographic location is also taken into account: requesters inside large networks are given higher weighting, as a large network is more likely to contain infected machines. A feature set representing this information is used to train a random forest classifier. When tested on 5 months of data taken from two authoritative name servers, the system achieved up to a 98% TP rate with a 0.5% FP rate, and it was even able to identify a new botnet based in China, which was later removed from the Internet.
While not explicitly analyzing DNS traffic, Ma et al. [2009] test the effectiveness of three popular classifiers (Bayes, SVM, and logistic regression (LR)) in identifying malicious domains. Datasets were created by combining blacklist data (for malicious domains) and online directory data (for benign domains) and then producing a dataset using several automatically extracted features. When tested using a 50-50 training/testing split, the SVM and LR algorithms achieved error rates of 1% to 3%. The interesting point is that the Bayes classifier, often chosen for its speed and scalability, achieved a higher error rate of 2.5% to 5%. The authors also tested the case where test data from a different dataset (different directory and blacklist) to the dataset that was used for training is used. The error rate was increased to 44%, which shows that in some cases training and testing on data from the same source may not give accurate real-world results.
4.4.3. Malicious Server Detection. Probing is not the only technique used for detecting servers. Bilge et al. [2012] propose DISCLOSURE, a system for identifying malicious servers from netflow data, extracting features related to flow sizes, client access patterns, and temporal behavior. In particular, the system is designed to work on very large (ISP-level) datasets, for which sampling may have been applied. Labeled netflow records are used to train a random forest classifier, which is able to achieve detection rates of 60% to 70%, with FP rates of 0.5% to 1%. To reduce FPs, information about autonomous systems (ASs) is taken from three public malicious server lists (FIRE, EXPOSURE, and Google Safe Browsing), and a reputation score is calculated for each AS using the information from all three sources. Servers found on networks with an AS score below a threshold are assumed to be FPs and thus are ignored, as the associated network is assumed to not participate in malicious activities. The authors also test the evasion resilience of the system by creating simulated netflow traffic for two botnets that introduce random delays between network connections, and random padding to vary flow lengths, making the botnets appear more like benign servers. By feeding this netflow data into their classifier, they were able to (a) successfully detect the botnets, (b) improve general detection rates, and (c) detect botnets that were not previously detected by their system (the netflow data to which the detection was applied was different from the data input into the classifier).
Clustering-Based Methods
The main disadvantage of using a signature-or classifier-based detection method is that these systems are usually not as effective at detecting new, or updated, malware due to an inherent assumption of stationary data. Considering that malware changes frequently, every time a new variant of malware is discovered, or an existing piece updates itself, the signatures have to be recreated or the classifier retrained. If the new variant is not discovered, then it is unlikely to be detected by these systems. Clustering-based systems can account for unknown behavior. In these systems, the algorithms attempt to separate different patterns of behavior without necessarily knowing itself what is malicious or benign. The output of clustering is often used to produce signatures.
One particular issue in detecting malware in large organizations is the problem of "dirty" logs. This refers to the large variety in logs that are kept by different systems that are often incompatible and inconsistent, and may also contain a large amount of duplication between different sets of logs. Security information and event management (SIEM) systems have been normalizing logs for several years, and this practice has been brought to the detection space. In Beehive [Yen et al. 2013] , log data is first normalized. For example, hosts are all mapped to IP addresses, and time stamps are all converted to UTC. A set of features are then extracted for each host, which can be tuned to the setting, but as an example contain traffic volume information and enterprise policy breaches (e.g., accessing blocked pages). An iterative variant of k-means clustering is then applied, which results in a set of outliers that are then labeled as suspicious. These hosts are then subject to manual investigation. When tested on a large enterprise network, the system produced alerts that were 25% malicious, 45% policy violations, and 35% labeled as other. Zhang et al. [2014] propose a system for detecting P2P botnets that differs from previous attempts in that it is unsupervised, meaning that no knowledge of existing malicious behavior is required. The system first applies clustering of flows to identify hosts that have taken part in P2P activity, and then it applies two layers of filtering and then hierarchical clustering to group hosts that are taking part in a malicious P2P network. They show that it can separate malicious P2P traffic from benign with a 100% TP rate and a low 0.02% FP rate.
In BotGrab, Yahyazadeh and Abadi [2015] also cluster flows using a custom online flow clustering algorithm but then apply a reputation engine to identify hosts that have a negative reputation. Reputation is based on participation in coordinated activities, an indication of botnet membership. The reputation engine can be combined with knowledge of hosts participating in malicious activities (e.g., DDoS) to achieve a TP rate of at least 97% and an FP rate of at most 2.3% (if the knowledge of malicious activities is not used, this is reduced to 92% and 2.02%, respectively). Yen and Reiter [2008] propose TĀMD, a system for identifying candidate groups of infected computers within a network by aggregating similar flows. Three aggregators extract aggregates of hosts based on communication destinations, packet payloads, and the host platform (OS). In particular, the destination aggregator makes use of a k-means clustering variant. This system is able to identify all malicious hosts in most cases (when VM outputs are inserted into background traffic), except for an IRC botnet, which achieved an 87% detection rate. 4.5.1. DNS Traffic Analysis. We have already discussed signature-and classifier-based detection systems that make use of DNS traffic analysis. We will now explore systems that use clustering-based methods. One proposed detection method is to make use of the reputation of domain names to decide if they are related to malicious activities [Antonakakis et al. 2010] . In this system (Notos), domains are clustered first by the IP addresses associated with them and second according to similarities in the syntactic structure of the domain names themselves. The k-means clustering algorithm is used. These clusters are then classified as malicious or not based on a collection of whitelists and blacklists: domains in a cluster that contains blacklist domains are likely to be malicious themselves. This system is run on local DNS servers and can achieve a TP rate of 96% and a low FP rate.
In an attempt to identify domains accessed as a result of a domain generation algorithm (DGA), Schiavoni et al. [2014] apply clustering to domains extracted from DNS queries. The system first filters and removes domains that are human pronounceable. The remaining domains are then clustered with those collected from blacklists using the DBSCAN clustering algorithm, using features related to the IPs to which the domains resolve. These clusters are used to extract fingerprints that are used to match new domains to known DGAs. When tested on a 3-month dataset taken from the DNSDB, with Conficker, Torpig, and Bamital domains inserted, the system could filter out 50%, 35%, and 62% of the DGA domains, respectively, resulting in recall between 81% and 94%. The system also contains an intelligence module that is able to track the evolution of IPs to which groups of domains point to monitor changes in botnet behavior.
Fast Flux Detection.
In a fast flux network (FFSN), the C&C server is hidden behind a proxy of numerous compromised hosts. Performing DNS queries on the domain of the server will return a large, and constantly changing, set of IP addresses. As you may expect, this type of behavior is relatively easy to detect.
There are some differences between FFSNs and content delivery networks (CDNs) [Holz et al. 2008] . To detect an FFSN is a simple process, due to the two characteristics of an FFSN: short TTL values in DNS responses and nonoverlapping DNS responses.
It is possible to automatically detect which domains belong to the same FFSN. In Fluxbuster, apply hierarchical clustering to domains so that they are grouped according to overlap in the returned IP addresses. By then comparing the clusters to previously labeled data, they can be classified (using the random forest classifier as flux or nonflux, revealing domains that make use of the same network. Tested on 5 months of live traffic data, the system is able to identify domains with a less than 1% FP rate.
Hybrid Detection Systems
BotMiner [Gu et al. 2008 ] is a system for detecting infected hosts without previous knowledge of specific botnets. In this system, bots are identified by clustering hosts that exhibit similar communication and (suspected) malicious activities. Activities are monitored using custom signatures for the Snort IDS. The clustering (x-means) groups hosts according to the botnet to which they belong, using the fact that hosts within the same botnet are likely to exhibit similar communication patterns and will usually perform activities synchronously (e.g., DDoS attacks). When tested on 10 days of university traffic, with the traffic of eight botnets inserted, the system achieved a 100% TP rate for six out of the eight botnets, with the other two achieving TP rates of 99% and 75%. The system achieves a low FP rate. Antonakakis et al. [2012] describe a system for identifying previously unseen DGAs by taking advantage of the fact that DGAs result in large amounts of nonexistent domain (NXDomain) responses, and bots within the same botnet will generate similar NXDomain traffic. The system has a three-step process. First, domains are clustered in two different ways using the x-means algorithm, first by string-based features of the domain name and second by domains that share source hosts. These two sets of clusters are then combined through intersection, and any clusters small enough are discarded. These clusters are then passed to a filtering step, which makes use of a multiclass variant of the alternating decision trees (ADT) classifier (trained on previously discovered DGAs) to remove known DGAs. The system then produces a hidden Markov model (HMM) for each DGA that can be used to evaluate single domain names. When tested on the traffic data from a U.S. ISP over a 15-month period, 360,700 NXDomains were discovered, queried by 187,600 distinct hosts. The system identified 12 DGAs, of which 6 were new. For assigning domains to known DGA algorithms using the HMMs, TP rates of 99.7% and FP rates of 0.1% can be achieved.
Graph-Based Detection
A slightly different approach for detection is to make use of graph-based detection approaches. These are becoming important due to the ability of graphs to be able to naturally represent communication patterns. These methods are still ML based, but they make use of graph-based methods as the statistical component of the algorithm.
Several works [Collins and Reiter 2007; Iliofotou et al. 2008 Iliofotou et al. , 2009 Zhao et al. 2009; Jelasity and Bilicki 2009] have applied graph analysis to detect botnets. The technique of Collins and Reiter [2007] detects anomalies induced in a graph of protocol-specific flows by botnet control traffic. They suggest that a botnet can be detected based on the observation that an attacker will increase the number of connected graph components due to a sudden growth of edges between unlikely neighboring nodes. Although it depends on being able to accurately model valid network growth, this is a powerful approach because it avoids depending on protocol semantics or packet statistics. However, this work only makes minimal use of spatial relationship information. Additionally, the need for historical record keeping makes it challenging in scenarios where the victim network is already infected when it seeks help and has not stored past traffic data. The system, when tested with real network traffic and artificial attacks, is able to identify bot activity with a TP rate of 65% to 90% and a low FP rate. Illiofotou et al. [2008, 2009] also exploit the dynamicity of traffic graphs to classify network flows to detect P2P networks. They use static (spatial) and dynamic (temporal) metrics centered on node-and edge-level metrics in addition to the largest-connected-component-size as a graph-level metric. BotGrep [Nagaraja et al. 2010] proposes a data mining technique to discover P2P graphs based on searching for expander graphs using random walks. The results of random walks are clustered to extract all P2P networks, which can then be identified using past knowledge (e.g., hosts representing honeypots). The system is able to identify P2P networks on ISP-level datasets with a 98% TP rate and 0.4% FP rate. Botyacc [Nagaraja 2014 ] performs a similar operation by producing a dual graph of the communication graph, applying the Laplace-Beltrami operator to reduce the dimensionality of the data, and then applying random walks to extract P2P networks. This can achieve detection rates of up to 99% with an FP rate below 0.1%. Invernizzi et al. [2014] make use of a graph-based approach to detect the binary download stage of the malware infection process in large-scale networks. Information collected from HTTP traffic is used to build undirected neighborhood graphs, where nodes represent IP addresses, domain names, FQDNs, URLs, URL paths, file names, and downloaded files (represented as hashes). A graph is generated for each host that exhibits malware-related behavior (e.g., domain fluxing). Graphs are then assigned a metric, based on the graph properties, on the likelihood that the candidate is malicious. When tested on a week-long ISP dataset, the system can achieve 60% precision and 90% recall on the malicious class, and 99.69% precision and 98.14% recall on the benign class, and is successful in identifying numerous malicious downloads.
Manadhata et al. [2014] incorporate belief propagation into a graph model for detecting malicious domains. An undirected graph is produced where nodes are hosts and domains, and edges go from hosts to domains that they access. Using a ground truth instantiated from public whitelists and blacklists, belief propagation is applied until stabilization occurs, with a domain labeled as malicious if the final belief value is above a threshold. This can achieve a TP rate of 95.2% and an FP rate of 0.68%. They also show that the system can be run in near real time (processing 3 hours of data takes 16 minutes), meaning that malicious domains could be detected within 16 minutes of first appearing. Jiang et al. [2010] also apply a graph-based technique for grouping suspicious domain names. In particular, they focus on DNS failures, where domain queries are returned unresolved. Although there are legitimate reasons for domain queries to be unresolved, it could be an indicator of bot activity, such as DGAs or FFSNs. The work aims to extract clusters of domains that represent similar behavior, indicating group activity. These clusters can then be used as input for further analysis to identify particular attacks. A bipartite graph is constructed with hosts and domains that result in failures as vertices, with an edge between a host and domain indicating at least one query from that host for that domain. Dense subgraphs (clusters) are then extracted, which can represent linked behavior. When tested on a campus network, the system found eight unknown clusters of domain names that could indicate malicious activity.
CATEGORIZING ATTACKS AGAINST ML
As is evident in Section 4, many (if not most) detection systems make use of an ML algorithm (or set of algorithms) as the main component of the system for either identifying or isolating C&C traffic. Before we discuss specific attacks against the ML algorithms in Section 6, we first discuss how to categorize attacks using various models from the literature. We also point out some weaknesses of ML algorithms and define the general threat model.
Weakness of ML Algorithms
Early C&C detection systems were designed for detection of indiscriminate malware attacks; however, the world has since changed. There has been an increase in more sophisticated, targeted malware attacks that specifically try to evade specific detection/ ML systems. According to Verizon [Verizon RISK Team 2013] , these now make up 25% of all attacks. The weakness of ML algorithms used in early detection systems as discussed in Section 4 is in their design intentions. The ML algorithms were designed for use in situations where an adversary is not trying to have an impact on the outcome of the algorithm. The same ML algorithms are still in use, even in work published within the past year, whereas the attack field has evolved from indiscriminate to targeted attackers. Even though the security community [Barreno et al. , 2010 agree that a threat model should be constructed before the learning component is designed, this step is missing from the ML component design step in almost all detection systems. Performance of the learning component in ideal conditions is usually the primary consideration when choosing an algorithm. An interesting work from Mersinas et al. [2015] discovers through surveying that IT security professionals (nonacademics) are risk averse and will generally favor security over operability. This contradicts what we see in C&C detection papers, where performance in terms of both processing time and TP and FP rates is the driving force behind the choice of algorithm, with a lack of proper security considerations.
Attacker
The attacks described in this section are in most cases too advanced for the indiscriminate attacker, such as an independent botmaster using a purchased rootkit. For the indiscriminate attacker, the target for attack is most often individuals and small businesses unlikely to have any sort of detection system past simple, consumer antivirus products that can be easily evaded.
For the well-resourced and well-motivated (e.g., state-sponsored) targeted attacker, these attacks are well within their capability. These attackers are knowledgeable professionals who can put in the effort required to carry out the attacks due to the large Note: The last two columns represent section numbers in this survey (NGE, not explicitly given in paper), and the type column indicates the ML type (S, signature based; C, classifier based; CL, clustering based; G, graph based; H, hybrid systems).
"profit" (in terms of money, information, and disruption depending on the target) that may be gained.
Categorizing Attacks
Barreno et al. [2006] , later revised in Huang et al. [2011] , devise a set of properties for categorizing attacks against ML algorithms (in particular, supervised learning algorithms) (Table II) . Their categorization takes into account the goals of the attack in terms of the specificity (targeted or indiscriminate), the security violation being instigated (integrity or availability), and the influence of the attack (causative or exploratory). 
Attack Goals
At the broadest level, the attacker will have one of two goals:
-The attacker will want to achieve anonymity in the sense that he want to hide his presence. -The attacker wants to compromise the integrity of the detection technique so that it becomes unusable.
Although both attacks will achieve the same end goal of the attacker avoiding detection, in the second case the defenders will be aware that they are under attack, alerting them to the attacker's presence. In the first case, however, the attacker's presence is not revealed. These goals can be expressed more precisely using the Barreno model, and subsequent expansion by Biggio et al. [2014c] . Biggio et al. expand the Barreno model to represent attacks against classifiers, but similar goals apply to attacks against clustering algorithms. The Biggio model makes use of the specificity and security violation classifications from the Barreno model, with the addition of the "privacy" security violation, indicating a case where an attack will try to gain information from the classifier.
Attacker Knowledge
One of the main considerations when discussing an attacker is the level of knowledge that an attacker has about the target system. In their attack against the PDFRate system,Šrndic and Laskov [2014] split this into knowledge about the classifier (and its parameters), the feature set in use, and the training set. The attack knowledge is then a combination of these, with knowledge of all three being the "perfect" case. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . There is also the case that the attacker can gain no knowledge at all. This model can be transferred to the clustering example by replacing "training dataset" with "test dataset" and "classifier algorithm" with "clustering algorithm." It is worth noting, however, that knowledge of the test dataset in a clustering algorithm is different from that of the training data used in a classifier. The training data used within a classifier is pre-existing and may be publicly available, so it could easily be gained by the attacker. However, the input to a clustering algorithm (test dataset) includes all new data (the new traffic data in the network example), so is more likely to only be estimated by the attacker. Biggio et al. [2014c] classify attacker knowledge specifically for the classification setting with more detail. As well as knowledge of the (1) training data and (2) feature set, they also incorporate the knowledge of the (3) learning algorithm and its decision function, (4) the decision function and its parameters, and (5) the feedback available from the classifier (e.g., the class labels applied to sample queries from the attacker).
The attacker knowledge can vary between systems. There is a difference between systems that stem from published research and commercially designed systems. Research papers that describe the design of systems are likely, at a minimum, to contain the ML algorithm in use, plus the training/test data used (which may be publicly available) and at least a subset of the features used. Any production system that is released as open source software reveals the ML algorithm and feature set, although the training data may be user specific. For commercial, closed source software, probing attacks or reverse engineering can be used to discover at least partial information about the system [Corona et al. 2013] .
The targeted attacker can improve his knowledge through research and social engineering techniques. For example, the motivated attacker could learn of contracts between an organization and detection system provider, leading the attacker to learn the detection system in use.
Attacker Capability
It is also important to consider the capability of the attacker. We assume that the attacker has no access to the control (ML) algorithm itself; however, he is limited to modifying the input (training or testing) data.
The ability of the attacker to change the data is in part limited by the specific application under consideration. For example, in the case of PDF files, certain features can be changed freely, although changing some features has a direct impact on other features [Šrndic and Laskov 2014] . Biggio et al. [2014c] define the capability of an attacker (against classification algorithms) using four measures:
(1) Attacker influence in terms of causative or exploratory (as previously described by Barreno et al. [2006] in Table II 
Key Terms
The following are some key terms used throughout the rest of article:
Learner. This refers to the ML algorithm. Surrogate learner. A surrogate learner is a copy of the learner produced by the adversary for testing attacks before they are carried out against the target. The surrogate has differing levels of completeness based on the attacker's knowledge. For example, the dataset in use could be an estimation of the one used by the target, or the learning algorithm, if unknown, could be substituted. Production learner. The production learner is the instance of the learner in use by the target.
A SURVEY OF ATTACKS AGAINST ML ALGORITHMS
In this section, we discuss attacks, taken from the literature, against the ML algorithms used in the malware C&C detection systems found in Table I . We group attacks by their goal (evasion or poisoning) and by the group of algorithms affected (classifiers or clustering). We then present several techniques for each, give examples of demonstrated attacks from the literature, and discuss any limitations of the attacks. Attacks are categorized according to the models defined in Section 5. In Section 7, we discuss the impact of these attacks in C&C detection problems.
We also look at some existing host-based techniques used by current malware to evade detection.
In this section, we focus on works relating to classical ML approaches, namely classifier-and clustering-based algorithms. We leave an analysis of the security of graph-based approaches to future work.
Evasion Attacks: Classifiers
6.1.1. Mimicry Attack. Wagner and Soto [2002] introduced the idea of a mimicry attackan attack in which the goal is to craft an attack point that appears as a benign point and hence is an example of an exploratory, integrity attack that can be either targeted or indiscriminate. The attack either aims to move the attack point into the benign area (indiscriminate) or attempts to mimic a particular benign point (targeted). The attack attempts to modify the features of the attack point such that an anomaly detector or classifier labels the point as benign. The attack is limited by the ability of the attacker to modify the features under consideration by the learner. This attack typically does not require knowledge about the classification algorithm in use, as the attack is focused on exploiting knowledge of the distribution of malicious and benign points.
Affected algorithms. The mimicry attack works by effectively reducing the distance between the attack point and benign points. The attack has been demonstrated against the random forest, Bayes, and SVM classifiers. As random forest is a multiple decision tree-based classifier, the attack should also be effective against single decision treebased algorithms such as C4.5. Biggio et al. [2013a] demonstrate a gradient descent attack that theoretically works against any classifier with a differentiable discriminant function, including SVMs and neural networks.
Demonstrated attacks. Wagner and Soto [2002] demonstrate the mimicry attack against a host-based IDS with a goal of identifying any traces of system calls that are accepted by the IDS but still carry out some malicious activity. The attack can be performed by either adding no-ops (system calls that have no side effect on the system) or removing system calls that cause alarms by replacing them with a different sequence of calls, which achieve the same end result (in exploiting the system). An example of this is to replace a sequence that opens up a root shell with one that adds a new root user to the shadow file. The attack is mimicry because the attackers find a sequence of calls that are accepted (labeled as benign) by the IDS, and thus the attack "mimics" a legitimate sequence of system calls. The attack is tested against the pH IDS [Somayaji and Forrest 2000] by modifying the autowx attack script exploit. The attack is shown to be able to successfully evade the IDS. Srndic and Laskov [2014] demonstrate a mimicry attack against PDFRate [Smutz and Stavrou 2012] , a system for the detection of malicious PDF files. PDFRate uses the random forest classifier to assign a score to PDF files, indicating their maliciousness. The system extracts 202 features by reading the file at the byte level and applying regular expressions to extract the feature values. By inserting data into the space between the cross-reference table and the trailer in the PDF file, attacks can be performed that will influence the output of PDFRate but will not affect the rendering of the file in a normal PDF reader, which will parse the file and skip that data. To perform a mimicry attack, the modifiable features are set to match those of a benign file. The attack, using a surrogate classifier, tries different benign files until one is found that suitably reduces the score output by the surrogate. The article focuses on attacks where the feature set is known (around 70% of the features are described in the original work). Attacks are tested first on a local version of PDFRate that is built using the available knowledge based on the adversary, then the best strategy is applied and the result is uploaded to PDFRate, with a goal of reducing the score assigned to the file. The attacker can modify the values of 35 features and increment a further 33 features. This is partly limited by the interdependability of the features. The attacks when applied onto files, which are then uploaded to PDFRate, can reduce the output score by 28% to 42% for attacks. Interestingly, when using a surrogate classifier using SVM rather than random forest, and then uploading the attack points to PDFRate, the scores output by PDFRate are still significantly reduced. Biggio et al. [2013a] demonstrate a mimicry attack with a gradient descent component against the SVM classifier and a neural network. The attack is considered in both the perfect knowledge (PK) situation, where the attacker knows all components of the classifier, and the limited knowledge (LK) situation, where the attacker only knows which classifier is in use and the feature set but not the training data or trained classifier (although an estimated surrogate training set can be produced). The attack modifies feature values until the attack point changes labels. This is performed using a gradient descent approach with a component that favors points which imitate benign points. Including the mimicry attack makes the attack suboptimal (when compared to the nonmimicry version described in Section 6.1.2). The attack is tested on two datasets: a dataset of handwritten digits (represented as greyscale images) for the PK case using a linear SVM classifier, and for malicious PDF detection (with features extracted according to previous work by Maiorca et al. [2012] ) in both the PK and SK cases using both SVM and neural networks. The handwritten digits were modified by changing the greyscale pixel values, whereas the PDF files were modified by adding objects (and therefore keywords). In the handwritten digits example using SVM with the linear kernel, the attack when containing the mimicry component is slower (requiring more iterations) but can cause the digits to appear as other digits, and in the LK case this could lead to a higher probability of evading the target classifier, requiring up to 50 modifications to achieve a false negative (FN) rate of 1. In the malicious PDF example, using linear SVM, the mimicry attack is effective in both the PK and LK cases. Fifty modifications (iterations of the gradient descent) increases the FN rate to 1 or 0.75 for the PK and LK cases, respectively. For the RBF kernel, 15 modifications still increases the FN rate up to around 0.8 in the PK case or 0.6 in the LK case. The neural network is more susceptible to the mimicry attack, requiring only 20 modifications in the PK case to result in an FN rate of 1, whereas in the LK case an FN rate of 0.5 can be achieved with 50 modifications. When not using the mimicry component, 50 modifications in the PK case only results in a FN rate of 0.2. It is explained that as the pure gradient descent only finds a local minimal, this may not be enough to evade; however, when incorporating the mimicry component, the attack point is drawn toward an area densely populated by benign points.
Traffic morphing, which shares similarities with the mimicry attack, has been shown to be effective against the Bayes classifier. Wright et al. [2009] show that it can be enough to simply emulate the traffic feature(s) that is the focus of the detection system. They show that this works in the case of identifying Web pages by traffic volume using the Bayes classifier, for which the accuracy can be reduced from 98% to 4%, or 63% if the classifier is trained with attack samples.
Attack limitations. The attack is limited in two ways. First, there could be features that are not modifiable to the extent required to perform the attack. There is also a limit on how far the malicious sample can be changed-the sample still needs to serve its original, malicious purpose. For example, in network traffic destination fields, IP addresses cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The attack also requires knowledge of what is seen as normal in the production learner, which may not be available (although this can usually be estimated).
6.1.2. Gradient Descent Attacks. The gradient descent attack is a relatively common attack within the literature. This attack is applied to both classifiers and clustering algorithms, and it applies a gradient descent function to find a state for the attack point that achieves the desired result (point misclassified). Gradient descent is an optimization algorithm that aims to minimize functions by iteratively moving a point (by changing parameter values) in the negative direction of the function gradient. In the evasion case, these are examples of exploratory integrity attacks. The typical approach is to generate an attack point and test its effectiveness on a surrogate learner. If the point is not sufficient, the gradient descent is applied and a new point is generated and tested until the desired result is achieved. In some cases, the gradient descent can be combined with a mimicry component to launch a targeted attack.
Affected algorithms. Because the gradient descent attack is not targeting a particular design component of classifiers, the attack is applicable to most classifiers. The attack finds any attack point that achieves the desired result for the attacker. For example, the technique used by Biggio et al. [2013a] , although only tested using SVM and neural networks, is theoretically applicable to any classifier with a differentiable discriminant function. We found example works (discussed in the following) against the SVM and random forest classifiers, as well as neural networks.
Demonstrated attacks.Šrndic and Laskov
[2014] apply a gradient descent-kernel density estimation (GD-KDE) attack against the PDFRate system for detecting malicious PDF files (as described in Section 6.1.1). The GD-KDE attack is used as a comparison to the mimicry attack. The GD-KDE attack is used to generate attack points using a surrogate classifier. They assume that the attacker does not know the classifier and thus replace the random forest classifier in their surrogate with an SVM classifier. The GD-KDE attack is able to reduce the score output by PDFRate by an amount of 29-35%, demonstrating the effectiveness against both the SVM and random forest classifiers. Biggio et al. [2013a] propose an attack based on gradient descent that works at test time and theoretically works against any classifier with a differentiable discriminant function, including SVM and neural networks. The gradient descent can be combined with a mimicry component, as discussed in Section 6.1.1. When tested on the handwritten digits dataset in the PK case using a linear SVM classifier, the attack is able to successfully change the output label with a limited number of iterations. In the malicious PDF detection example, the attack is able to increase the FN rate to close to 1, with under 15 modifications to the attack point for the linear SVM with PK (full knowledge of classifier, feature set, and training data). With LK (knowledge of classifier and feature set only), 40 modifications are required, but 15 modifications still increases the FN rate up to 0.8. The results are only marginally worst for the RBF kernel. The neural network is more robust, as 50 modifications only increases the FN rate to around 0.3 for the PK case and 0.1 for the LK case. The authors mention that the gradient descent often does not successfully find an attack point for the neural network, because for the majority of samples, the local minimum found by the gradient descent is too far from the decision boundary to cause misclassification, and thus the gradient descent terminates early.
Attack limitations. As with the mimicry attack, this attack is limited by the amount the attacker can modify the feature values. The attack also requires enough knowledge to be able to build a surrogate classifier to test candidate attack points. The more accurate the surrogate, the higher the chance of success of the attack.
Other Attacks.
Genetic programming. Xu et al. [2016] apply a genetic programming approach to evading PDF malware classifiers, more specifically PDFRate [Smutz and Stavrou 2012] and Hidost [Šrndic and Laskov 2013] systems. PDFRate makes use of the random forest classifier (as described in Section 6.1.1), whereas Hidost makes use of SVM. Hidost, according to its authors, is robust against adversaries, only suffering from two additional FPs (out of 5,000 samples) under the "strongest conceivable mimicry attack". In contrast to previous work, the attack assumes no knowledge on behalf of the attacker, with the attacker only having access to a black box implementation of the target (the deployed system). Also in contrast to previous work, where it is assumed that attackers can only increase feature values (to maintain malicious behavior), the attacker in this scenario is able to modify feature values in many ways. The attack works by generating attack traces that represent series of operations of the original file to cause misclassification. Traces are computed using an iterative approach, with random operations applied to the file (e.g., inserting a page from a benign file). The modifications are evaluated using a fitness function, which incorporates the score from the target detector, and whether or not the file still carries out its intended malicious behavior (evaluated using an oracle in the form of a sandbox). The attack is instantiated by taking a set of malicious files as an initial population and then applying the modifications. Previously found successful traces are applied to some files to create new starting points to aid in finding attacks. The attack is tested on 1,348 malicious PDF files and is shown to be able to evade both PDFRate and Hidost with a 100% success rate. Attack traces generated for Hidost, but submitted to PDFRate, were able to evade detection in 77.6% of cases, whereas in the reverse case, only two seeds were able to evade detection. The authors speculate that this is due to the different feature sets in use by each system. Tree ensemble evasion. Kantchelian et al. [2016] propose a method of evading tree ensemble-based classifiers such as boosted trees and random forest. Two approaches are proposed: an optimal case using a mixed integer linear program (MILP) solver and a lighter approximate evasion algorithm based on iterative coordinate descent for use on more complex ensemble models where the optimal approach is too time consuming. The goal is to find the attack point that changes the classifier output, where the distance from the original is minimized according to one of four distance
The attack is tested using the MNIST handwritten digits dataset, tested against boosted decision trees and random forest, plus a linear LR, a simple neural network, SVM with the RBF kernel, and a shallow neural network based on convex polytope machines. Although the boosted trees and random forest are shown to have competitive accuracies when not under attack, they are shown to be far less robust than the other classifiers when under attack, requiring a smaller evasion distance, particularly in the L 1 and L 2 cases, where the evasion distance is negligible. The authors also propose a method for improving robustness by including attack samples in the training data; however, it is found that when providing strong resilience to L − 0 attacks, the classifier becomes less robust to the other types.
Evasion Attacks: Clustering
6.2.1. Mimicry Attacks. The mimicry attack works by effectively reducing the distance between the attack point and benign points. Although the attack has primarily been demonstrated against classifiers, it should also be effective against any clustering that uses a distance function. For example, the attack would be effective against the hierarchical clustering algorithm. The required effort on behalf of the attacker will depend in part on the cut parameter in use (this is the level in the hierarchy from which clusters are read; the lower the cut, the more fine-grain the clustering), which in part dictates the distance between and number of clusters. The mimicry attack could also be used against the k-means clustering algorithm. The main limitation against k-means is that if a sufficiently high value of k is used, then the output clusters will be tight, meaning that the attack point will have to mimic the target point almost completely.
Demonstrated attacks. Biggio et al. [2013b] define an obfuscation attack against single-linkage hierarchical clustering that is functionally equivalent to a mimicry attack. The attack works by selecting a target cluster, with which the attack point should be clustered. A line is then drawn between the original attack point and the nearest point within the target cluster, and the new attack point is chosen from a point on this line no more than a maximum distance (defined by the attackers ability to modify features) from the original attack point. This is tested in the PK (full knowledge of the algorithm, features, and data) case using the MNIST handwritten digits dataset of greyscale images (as discussed in Section 6.1.1). The attack is able to successfully merge attack samples into the target cluster with limited modifications.
Gradient Descent Attacks.
The gradient descent approach can also be used in an evasion attack for clustering algorithms. As with the classification example, the attacker will require a surrogate classifier. The attacker will then need to move the data point that he wishes to hide until it is merged into a benign cluster. As before, this is a exploratory integrity attack. The attack requires a large amount of knowledge to be successful, particularly relating to the shape of the benign data. The attack should be effective against any distance-based clustering algorithm as long as the local optimum attack point found is close enough to a benign cluster.
Attack limitations. For best results, the attacker will require knowledge of the benign data with which the attack point will be clustered. Without any knowledge of the other test data, the local optimum attack point may not be close enough to benign clusters to be successfully merged. The attacker could estimate this data using previous data to which he has access; however, this will potentially reduce the effectiveness of the attack (depending on how much the test data compares to the surrogate dataset).
Knowledge of the parameters of the clustering algorithm may also have an impact. For example, the threshold used within hierarchical clustering dictates how close the attack point will need to be to the benign points to successfully merge. Similarly, the k value used in k-means will dictate how fine grain the clustering is-a larger k value will require the attack point to be closer to the benign points. If the attacker were to compute the attack point with different parameter values to the test clustering algorithms, the attack may not be successful.
Poisoning Attacks: Classifiers
6.3.1. Label-Flipping Attacks. Label-flipping attacks are a form of poisoning attack with a goal of introducing label noise into the training data by flipping labels. The attacker is able to cause an amount of the legitimate samples to be labeled as malicious in the training data or an amount of the malicious samples to be labeled as legitimate. The amount is down to the capability of the attacker. Label flipping is an example of a causative integrity/availability attack that attempts to maximize classification error. There have been many attempts at designing ML algorithms to provide robustness against random label noise arising from noisy datasets, but these designs do not consider the adversarial case where the attacker attempts to maximize the classification error. The extent to which labels can be flipped is restricted by a budget (the number of labels that can be flipped).
In the real world, the attacker would need to have an impact on the data collection phase. There are several ways that they could do this. One of the most common methods for collecting malware data is through the use of honeypots and sandboxes. Malware has been shown to be able to identify when it is being run in a virtual environment (see Section 6.6), so the malware could be programmed to engage only in legitimate behavior when in a sandbox, which would then create legitimate samples that are labeled as malicious.
Affected algorithms. The attack has been demonstrated against the SVM classifier, although it should affect any classification algorithms affected by label noise.
Demonstrated attacks. Xiao et al. [2012] discuss a causative attack against SVMs that makes use of label flipping to poison the training set. In this attack, the adversary flips labels of training points, constrained by a budget, with attack points chosen to inflict the maximum loss. On an artificial, two-dimensional dataset, the attack is able to increase the error rate up to 32% (on a binary class dataset with a 50/50 split), which is not far from reducing the classifier to a random guess. When tested on a set of 10 real-world datasets (downloaded from the LIBSVM Web site), the attack is able to reduce the classifier to a random guess (a 50% error rate) by flipping 10% of the labels of the training set. An interesting observation is that the attack is tested on an SVM classifier trained with both a linear kernel and an RBF kernel, and is found to be much more susceptible to attack when using the RBF kernel. The authors speculate that this is due to the fact that when using the RBF kernel, instances are mapped to the infinite dimensional feature space, and thus instances are more sparsely distributed. Therefore, flipping a label has a greater effect on the hyperplane. This indicates that even variations of the same ML algorithm have different tolerances to the same attack. The attack is also effective to a lesser degree against the label noise robust SVM (LN-SVM) algorithm [Biggio et al. 2011b ].
Attack limitations. The primary limitation of the attack is the budget limiting the number of points in the training set that can have their labels flipped. The more restrictive the budget, the more restricted is the attack. The attack also requires some knowledge on behalf of the attacker of the classifier and training data in use. If this information is limited, then the attack becomes far more difficult for the attacker.
6.3.2. Gradient Descent Attacks. Gradient descent-based poisoning attacks impact the availability of the learner. These are causative attacks, which can be either targeted or indiscriminate in nature.
As opposed to the evasion case (see Sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2), where attack points are moved to be misclassified, in the poisoning case, the gradient descent attack inserts attack points into the training data chosen to maximize the impact on the classifier performance, with a goal of reducing performance to the level that the classifier is unusable. The common approach is to start with a benign point, flip its label, and move it (according to the gradient descent function) to maximize the objective function.
Affected algorithms. The gradient descent-based poisoning attack has been demonstrated against the SVM.
Poisoning attacks work by effectively introducing adversarial noise into the training data. In that sense, a gradient descent-based attack is theoretically effective against any classification algorithm that is not tolerant to noise. Even if an algorithm is tolerant to random noise, it may be possible to apply the attack in a controlled manner and still successfully carry out the attack, although the complexity will be increased.
Demonstrated attacks. Biggio et al. [2012] demonstrate a poisoning attack against SVM. The attack assumes knowledge of the training set used by the learner. The attacker inserts attack points by flipping the label of a point in the target class to create an initial attack point and then applies a gradient descent to find an optimal attack point that is then added to the training set. When evaluated on an artificial, two-dimensional dataset, the attack can achieve a classification error of up to 0.06 for a linear kernel and 0.035 for the RBF kernel. The attack is also tested on the handwritten digits dataset mentioned previously using an SVM with the linear kernel, which achieves a classification error of 0.1 to 0.3 after 200 iterations of the gradient descent algorithm.
Attack limitations. The attack is limited by the amount of noise that the attacker can inject. One example is the attacker's ability to cause data points to be labeled as they require. For example, when attacking a spam filter, the spam label usually arises from the user, and thus the attacker is reliant on the oracle labeling the points in the way the attacker desires.
6.3.3. Dictionary Attacks. A dictionary attack is a specific form of poisoning attack that can be carried out against classifiers trained using token-based features. In this attack, malicious data is inserted into the training set that contains tokens (e.g., words) which can be found in benign data. The intention is that the malicious data will be discovered and included in future training sets. The goal is then to cause benign data to be misclassified as malicious, indicating a causative availability attack. This can both be indiscriminate (any benign point can be misclassified) or targeted (the attacks want to cause a particular benign sample to be misclassified). provide attacks against SpamBayes, 1 a system for identifying spam email messages. Two causative availability attacks are proposed against the system. The first, an indiscriminate dictionary attack, sends emails to a destination covered by SpamBayes that contains words likely to appear in legitimate emails. These spam emails will be included in the training data when the system is retrained (which happens periodically), increasing the likelihood that legitimate emails will be labeled as spam. In the optimal case, the emails will contain the full English dictionary. As a refinement, the email can just contain a dictionary closer to the victim's word distribution.
The second attack, a targeted attack, assumes knowledge of a specific email that the attacker does not want the intended recipient to read by causing it to appear in the victim's spam folder. This attack involves including words specific to that email in the attack emails, and hence the attack effectiveness is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the structure of the target email. In the optimal case, this will be the full dictionary attack, which will contain all of the target words.
When tested on a large dataset, the attacks are proved to be effective. The dictionary attack, when attack emails make up 1% of the dataset (achievable by a large-scale attacker), can cause 90% of the legitimate emails to be labeled as unsure or spam. The targeted attack can, with 30% knowledge of the target email, change classification in 60% of cases.
The SpamBayes algorithm is shared by Bogofilter 2 and SpamAssassin, 3 and thus the proposed attacks should have a large impact on these systems as well.
Poisoning Attacks: Clustering
6.4.1. Bridging Attacks. Bridging attacks are a form of poisoning attack that has been demonstrated against clustering algorithms. As with the other poisoning algorithms, they are examples of causative integrity/availability attacks.
The attack introduces points into the space between clusters with a goal of causing clusters to split and merge. For example, in hierarchical clustering introducing points between clusters causes the intercluster distance to be affected, which can then cause clusters to merge.
Affected algorithms.
The attack has been demonstrated against variant of the hierarchical clustering algorithm. The attack should be effective against any clustering algorithm that uses the intercluster distance. The attack may have an effect against centroid-based algorithms such as k-means clustering, although to a lesser extent. The introduction of points between clusters will have an effect on the final placement of centroids, which could cause points to be clustered with points with which they would not have previously been clustered. The clusters are unlikely to merge (depending on the structure of the data and initial location of the centroids), but if the attack points are chosen carefully, the attack points could cause clusters to merge.
Demonstrated attacks. The Malheur system is the target of work by Biggio et al. [2014d] . Malheur [Rieck et al. 2011 ] applies single-(or complete)-linkage hierarchical clustering to MIST malware behavior reports, which contain sequences of host-based system events, where individual execution flows of threads and processes are grouped in a single, sequential report.
The paper assumes the scenario in which the attacker has PK and reduces the attack to an optimization problem, in which the objective function to be maximized is the distance of the clusters formed when under attack from the clusters formed in absence of the attack. The attack goal is to cause clusters to merge until the system becomes unusable. The attack is run on a local version of the system, where all possible attack points are considered, and only the one that has the largest impact is used. The attack is applied iteratively, continuously adding points until the objective function is maximized. The attacks also propose two variations that are less computationally expensive, as they instead estimate the effect of the attack points rather than re-run the clustering algorithm. To generate attack samples, an existing malware sample is taken and features are manipulated by increasing their value (to maintain the malicious capability of the samples).
When tested on two datasets, the same dataset used in the original Malheur paper and a new malware dataset collected by the authors, the bridge attack is able to reduce the number of clusters from 40 to 5 with only 2% of injected samples. The estimation-based approaches require more injected samples but are far less computationally expensive. To verify the results, two random-based attacks (one that generates an attack point at random and one that chooses the best of several random attack points) are shown to be ineffective. Finally, an attack that works as the bridge attack but minimizes the F-measure achieves comparable results to the bridge attack.
Very similar attacks are applied to three different datasets in Biggio et al. [2013b] : the banana-shaped dataset from PRTOOLS, a malware C&C dataset, and a dataset of handwritten digits. As before, PK on behalf on the attacker is assumed. The attack aims to cause clusters to split or merge to impact on the availability of the algorithm. The attacks are compared against a random approach. On the banana-shaped dataset, the bridge attacks are found to outperform the random attacks. The best approach results in a lower number of final clusters than in the unpoisoned dataset. On the malware dataset, the results are similar. On the digits dataset, the random approaches are shown to be ineffective. The three bridge-based approaches cause significant fragmentation of the final clusters.
Attack limitations. To achieve maximum results, the attack requires PK of the target classifier, which can be an unrealistic assumption in the real world. The attack could still be successful if a surrogate dataset is used to approximate the target classifier, although this has not been explored in the literature. The attacker only requires knowledge of one other cluster to perform the bridge attack. This cluster could be estimated with a high accuracy (e.g., the traffic to "facebook.com" will be similar wherever it appears and thus may be reliably estimated).
6.4.2. Gradient Descent Attacks. As with classifiers, gradient descent poisoning attacks on clustering algorithms are causative availability attacks. In the clustering case, attack points are inserted to cause clusters to split and possibly merge with others, reducing the accuracy the clustering. Attack points are created and the most effective points are found by maximizing the objective function using a gradient descent approach.
Affected algorithms. This class of attack has been demonstrated against hierarchical clustering.
As this type of attack exploits the distance function used within the clustering algorithms, it is theoretically applicable to other types of clustering, such as k-means. However, whereas a single attack point can be sufficient to cause a cluster to split in algorithms that use intracluster distance (e.g., hierarchical clustering), to cause a split in centroid-based algorithms would likely require a larger number of attack points to significantly shift the centroids, causing changes to the generated clusters.
Demonstrated attacks. The complete-linkage variant of hierarchical clustering is also attacked by Biggio et al. [2014a] . The attack is again a poisoning attack with PK on behalf of the attacker. In this attack, attack points are added to the edge of clusters with a goal of causing the cluster to split, and possibly merge with another. As before, the attack is run iteratively with the goal of maximizing the objective function (which represents the distance between the clustering output under attack compared to not under attack). There are also two variants that use estimation to reduce the number of iterations required. This attack is tested against three datasets (taken from Biggio et al. [2013b] ). In the first, taken from PRTools, the extend attack causes the clustering to result in a smaller number of more distinct clusters. The second dataset, which contains malware C&C behavior represented by six features, gives similar results. Finally, a dataset of handwritten digits, represented by 28 × 28 greyscale images converted into 784 dimensional data, is used. In this case, the estimation attacks are more effective than the fully iterative attack.
Attack limitations.
As in the classification case, the attack is limited by the amount of noise that the attacker can inject. Depending on the density of the data, the attacker may be required to introduce a large number of attack points to cause significant degradation in performance.
6.5. Other Attacks 6.5.1. Attacks on ASG. Perdisci et al. [2006a] propose an attack against Polygraph [Newsome et al. 2005 ], a system for automatically generating signatures for the detection of polymorphic worms. The attack assumes that an attacker who controls host A, and wants to infect host B, will send a malicious flow containing the attack code. The hope is that host B will be used for collecting flows for input into Polygraph.
The attack works by sending extra flows along with all malicious flows, which are constructed to not actually perform any attack but contain specifically crafted data that will cause the generated signatures to only include data related to the protocol framework rather than invariants related to the worm, effectively rendering the signature useless. The false flows are generated by taking a copy of the malicious flow and applying several transformations over it. These include randomly permuting bytes and injecting substrings from legitimate flows.
The attack is tested on a recreation of Polygraph using the Apache Knacker exploit for the polymorphic worm, with flows collected from the university network for use as innocuous traffic. The original Polygraph paper claims that 80% noise is required to affect the system, but the authors find that one false flow per malicious flow can result in useless signatures up to 44% of the time. If two flows are used, this increases to up to 85%. Newsome et al. [2006] propose a causative integrity attack against conjunction learners (of which Polygraph is an example), dubbed red herring attacks. The attack involves including spurious features into attack samples, which will be included in signatures. To evade detection, the attacker then stops including the extra features. This attack only works on conjunction learners and is not effective against other ML algorithms, such as Bayes. For Bayes learners, they propose a causative availability attack, dubbed the correlated outlier attack. In this attack, the attack sample includes spurious features that appear in legitimate samples. This increases the Bayes score of legitimate samples, leading to a choice of either high FPs or FNs.
Chung and Mok [2006, 2007] propose "allergy attacks" against the Autograph [Kim and Karp 2004] signature generator. Allergy attacks have a goal of performing a denialof-service attack by leading the generator to produce signatures that match to normal traffic. The attack is performed by first sending attack traffic that causes Autograph to mark the node as suspicious, then traffic that resembles legitimate traffic. The attack can be supplemented with a corpus so that it will also affect Polygraph and similar automatic signature generation systems. The authors show that the attack is successful with only a small number of packets required to cause a target site to be blacklisted. 6.5.2. Attacks on IDSs. Fogla et al. [2006] propose polymorphic blending attacks against the PAYL, a byte frequency-based IDS [Wang and Stolfo 2004; Wang et al. 2006] . The attack extends polymorphic attacks by adding a blending component that, like mimicry attacks, matches the statistics of mutated attack instances to normal traffic profiles to evade byte frequency-based networks' anomaly IDSs. This is done by "encrypting" the packet payloads by using a substitution table that replaces bytes in the original packet with bytes in the target distribution. Padding is also added, and packets can be split to match the normal distribution. The substitution table is sent along with the packet, as well as a "decrypter" that can recover the original packet. The attack also ensures that the attack distribution matches the normal distribution despite the table and decrypter being included. The attack is tested on both the 1-gram and 2-gram variants of PAYL, using the MS03-022 vulnerability as the base attack. The normal traffic distribution is taken from 1 day collected from a university network, and the training set for PAYL is taken from a further 14 days. The attacks are tested with target packet lengths of 418,730 and 1,460. Such attacks are shown to be effective in reducing the anomaly score output by PAYL to below thresholds that would realistically be used. They also find that increasing the number of packets used by the attack (meaning smaller individual packets) further reduced the anomaly score, as the smaller packets could be made to more closely match the normal distribution. The authors provide a formal analysis of the attack in Fogla and Lee [2006] .
Emerging Host-Based Evasion Techniques
We briefly review some techniques on the host side used by malware in the wild to evade detection. Recently, there has been an increasing amount of malware that provides methods of evading current detection and analytical systems.
Evading signatures. Traditional defense systems (e.g., traditional antivirus and intrusion detection) often rely on signatures to detect attacks or malicious code. A signature characterizes a known attack by defining its characteristics. For example, in the context of malware, a signature could be a regular expression that matches the bytes found in a specific malicious file. Unfortunately, several obfuscation techniques have been proposed (and are used extensively) to counter signature-based detection. For example, polymorphism [Hosmer 2008 ] is a technique that enables an attacker to mutate an existing malicious binary and create a completely new version from it while retaining its original functionality but remaining undetected by current signatures. The antivirus vendor Kaspersky recently reported detecting more than two unique malicious samples per second, likely the result of extensive application of polymorphic techniques [Kaspersky 2013 ].
Evading dynamic analysis systems. To overcome the limitations of signature-based analysis of malicious code, researchers use dynamic analysis tools, also called sandboxes [Egele et al. 2012] . These tools execute a binary in an instrumented environment and classify it as either benign or malicious depending on the observed behavior.
To thwart automated dynamic analysis, malware authors have developed several checks (so-called red pills). To detect sandboxes, the checks leverage differences in execution characteristics between a real host and virtualized environments [Ferrie 2007] or emulated systems [Paleari et al. 2009 ]. Further, malware may execute its malicious payload or specific parts of its code only when some "trigger" fires (i.e., only when some specific precondition is satisfied) [Moser et al. 2007] . As another evasion technique, malware may use stalling code [Kolbitsch et al. 2011] , which delays execution of malicious activity just long enough that the automated analysis system stops the analysis having observed benign activity only and moves on. This technique simply leverages the fact that to analyze a large volume of programs, an analysis system must bound the time that it spends executing a single sample to a limited time (in the order of few minutes).
Evading reputation systems. Another defensive approach that has gained traction in the past few years is the use of reputation information for network entities (servers or domain names). Malware authors have a crude but effective attack against such reputation blacklists: they use a certain server or domain for malicious purposes only for a very limited amount of time. Recent data from researchers at Google shows that this strategy is well in use: they studied domains hosting exploit kits used in driveby downloads and found that their median lifetime is only 2.5 hours [Grier et al. 2012] . Clearly, an effective blacklist should be able to detect the malicious domain and distribute this knowledge to all enforcement devices before the domain has been abandoned. It is unclear why secure ML algorithms are not in more widespread use within the field of C&C detection. In the following, we discuss possible reasons as to why secure ML is not in use.
Lack of awareness. One obvious reason is simply a lack of awareness of secure ML algorithms. Unless one specifically looks toward the secure ML field, they are unlikely to be aware of the more secure algorithms, or even that the vulnerabilities in the simpler algorithms exist.
Ease of access. More specifically, we mean access to an implementation of the code, either through an open source piece of available software, API, or an algorithm that is easy to implement by an academic. Even if a piece of software or API exists, it may not be available for the desired scenario without large amounts of preprocessing on the data to ensure that it is in the correct format. If we compare this to popular algorithms such as k-means or SVM, these have many implementations (in both software and libraries) that can easily be applied to almost any dataset.
Reduced performance. It may be the case that secure ML algorithms, when compared to the nonsecure counterparts, achieve lower performance in terms of both processing time and key metrics (TPR/FPR and similar). When evaluating detection systems, these metrics are key selling points that elevate new work mentioned previously. Although this assumption is not true for all works, there are some examples in the literature. For example, Brückner and Scheffer [2011] demonstrate an increase in execution time in the multiclassifier system from approximately 10 1 to more than 10 3 seconds using the largest training set. In terms of accuracy, some works [Zhang et al. 2015; Biggio et al. 2011a ] show a reduction in performance when not under attack, whereas others show a slight increase [Biggio et al. 2010] .
Lack of clear security metrics. When choosing an ML algorithm, it is common to look to the standard performance metrics (TP/FP rates, precision, recall, computation efficiency, etc.) . In a nonsecure setting, these are usually sufficient in choosing one algorithm over another. However, as far as we are aware, there are currently no clear metrics for measuring the evasion resilience of ML algorithms. We believe that a lack of these metrics is one of the reasons more secure ML algorithms are not in use-there is currently no way to see a measurable benefit to their use over the simpler algorithms. This is not a trivial problem due to the large range of threat models that need to be considered, as the threat model in use impacts the achieved level of evasion resilience.
Lack of evidence of attacks. The reason for not using secure algorithms could be purely because there is little to no evidence of attacks targeting ML in practical applications. Attackers are likely to evade detection using simpler methods instead of attacking ML algorithms. However, as systems mature, we should expect attackers to become more sophisticated in succeeding in their efforts to subvert it, and thus it is only a matter of time before attacks against ML become more commonplace.
Difficulty of Applying Attacks in C&C
Almost all of the attacks against ML algorithms discussed in Section 6 were applied to simplified use cases using easily modifiable data points. In many of the cases, the features could easily be modified to carry out the attack. However, in the malware C&C case, the features may not be as modifiable as in some other examples. For example, take a simple C&C channel that sends data to a centralized server over TCP. Some features, such as any relating to the packet contents (length, n-grams, etc.) , or the number and size of packets, are easy for the attacker to modify. However, other feature values, such as those representing IP addresses, port numbers, or protocol flags, are not as easily modifiable, as they could either have an impact on the functionality of the communication channel, if changed, or not be under the control of the attacker.
Carrying out poisoning attacks that require influencing the training data may also prove to be difficult. The attacker would have to ensure that his attack points are collected by the system engineers to be included. As an example, this may rely on the attacker's malware being caught in a honeypot, and it may be difficult for an attacker to ensure that this occurs.
7.2.1. Availability of Attacker Knowledge. In all of the attacks discussed in Section 6, the attacker requires some level of knowledge to perform the attack. The amount of knowledge required varies between the different attacks. For example, the mimicry attack can be successful using surrogate datasets and algorithms that do not necessarily match those in use at test time. However, for attacks such as those based on gradient descent, more specific knowledge is required for the attack to be effective.
One issue is this: in the real world, how much of this knowledge is available to the attacker? In part, this depends on the target (organization) of the attacker. Through social engineering techniques, the attacker may be able to work out the specific detection systems in use and therefore gain information about the algorithms, and possible feature sets in use, either through information published by vendors or through reverse engineering. If the target system is an off-the-shelf product, the attacker could simply purchase a copy to use as a surrogate. It is well known that malware authors test new malware against popular antivirus systems prior to deployment.
Knowledge of the specific training data in use also depends on the specific target. The training data may not be made public by the system designers, or the training data could be tailored to suit a particular customer's network (to maximize performance). In the real world, the attacker is far more likely to be able to create a surrogate training by making use of public datasets and incorporating benign data that is expected to appear.
Effectiveness Against Full C&C Detection Systems
Although ML algorithms are a core component of C&C detection systems, the ML algorithm is not the only step. Many of the systems will apply various levels of preand postprocessing to the data, including but not limited to whitelisting/blacklisting, noise reduction, and data sampling. Clustering algorithms are often used as a way to separate data to create signatures afterward, which may be tolerant to some degree of error. The attack examples discussed in Section 6 usually focus on a scenario where the test samples only undergo feature extraction and are then fed directly into the ML algorithm. Therefore, it is unclear to what degree extra steps in the C&C detection system will influence the effectiveness of the discussed attacks. Of course, some of these extra components may also aid the attacker. For example, BotMiner [Gu et al. 2008] (a C&C detection system that uses x-means clustering as the main ML algorithm) generates some of its input data through the alerts thrown out by an anomaly detector. In the process of attempting to attack the clustering algorithm, such as through the use of a mimicry attack, the attacker may also inadvertently evade the anomaly detector, meaning that he is far less likely to be detected (in the case of BotMiner, there are other data sources; however, the anomaly detector inputs play a major role).
Limitations of Current Detection Approaches
In surveying the field of C&C detection approaches, we found several limitations.
Limited datasets. Acquiring useful datasets is a well-known problem for malware researchers. Legal requirements often state that datasets cannot be released once created, meaning that each new system will usually need to have a dataset created for it. This data may not be a true representation of a real-world situation, indicating that the observed performance may not be repeatable in the real world.
Limited reproducibility of datasets. Typically, C&C detection systems are evaluated using network traces collected from real-world networks-from smaller university networks up to the ISP level. These datasets are almost never released for use by others due to contractual agreements and privacy concerns. This makes it difficult to reproduce the evaluation of these detection systems.
Testing on known malware. A problem that is especially evident in systems that rely on classifiers is the problem of testing on a small collection of known malware samples. These samples are used to generate signatures, and then the traffic from the same samples is used to generate a test dataset. This can lead to higher detection rates than would be seen in the more realistic situation where the classifier is trained only on related malware families.
Lack of scalability testing. Due to finite resources both in terms of data availability and processing, the testing of detection systems is often small scale in nature or large scale but run in batch mode, thus taking a long time. Many of these systems are designed with the intention of being installed within a corporate network or even an ISP, where the volume of data to be processed may be far larger and closer to real-time detection is required. Some systems that work well in a small-scale setting may break down in a larger-scale environment.
Attack Defenses
We will now cover a few approaches to defending against the attacks discussed in Section 6. Note that a complete survey is outside the scope of this work, so we only focus on defenses relevant to C&C detection systems. For a more detailed discussion on defenses against attacks, we refer the reader to Biggio et al. [2014b] .
Defending against ML attacks is a difficult task. Defenders can take both reactive and proactive approaches [Biggio et al. 2014b] . In a reactive approach, the defender observes an attack and then incorporates countermeasures into the existing system. In a proactive approach, the defender anticipates the adversary's strategy and develops countermeasures before deployment. The majority of defenses are proactive in nature, attempting to limit the capability of the adversary before deployment. In particular, the two common approaches are the use of multiclassifier systems (MCSs) and ideas from game theory to predict and model the attack at training without having access to attacker data.
One of the most common approaches to defend against evasion attacks on classifiers is to make use of MCSs [Kolcz and Teo 2009; Zhang et al. 2015; Biggio et al. 2010] , in which the combined output of several classifiers is used to make a decision. The different classifiers vary by either using different subsets of the feature set or different subsets of the training data. One variation of MCSs is to make use of one-class classifiers, which can be more effective in identifying attacks. One-class classifiers produce a tight decision surface around the target objects (e.g., the benign objects) and output how much a data point matches that target rather than outputting a label from a set. These work particularly well when combined with two-class classifiers, as described by . They find that whereas two-class classifiers achieve better accuracy when not under attack, one-class classifiers achieve better accuracy while under attack. The classifiers are all based on SVMs. By combining two one-class classifiers and one two-class classifier, a more robust MCS is produced. Performance of the MCS is less affected when under attack, particularly good word insertion (GWI)/bad word obfuscation (BWO) attacks against spam filters and adding features in PDF files, compared to a single SVM classifier. Perdisci et al.[2006b] make use of a set of one-class SVM classifiers to provide resistance against mimicry attacks in payload-based IDSs (e.g., PAYL). When tested against polymorphic blending attacks [Fogla et al. 2006 ], the SVM-based multiclassifier IDS is able to detect the occurrence of all attacks with a 0.5% FP rate (correctly identifying 99.2% of all attack packets). Biggio et al. [2010] evaluate the robustness of two approaches to MCSs: bagging (in which each classifier is trained with a subset of the training data) and the random subspace method (RSM, where each classifier is trained with all of the data but a subset of the feature set). The two approaches are tested using linear SVM and LR in the spam detection scenario under the GWI/BWO evasion attack (with both PK and LK). When not under attack, the bagging and RSM MCSs almost always outperform the single classifiers. Under the PK attack, the bagging method reduces the impact of the attack for both the SVM and LR classifiers, whereas the RSM method only improves the robustness of LR. In the LK case, LR is improved slightly by both the bagging and RSM methods, whereas SVM is improved by bagging only. Zhang et al. [2015] present a method for performing feature selection while providing robustness to evasion attacks. Feature selection, where only a subset of the possible features are used for training, is used to reduce the time and computational complexity of the algorithm, and provides better learning on smaller training sets. However, this can lead to further evasion if the adversary is aware of the features that are selected due to the fact that there are fewer features to attack. The proposed method, wrapper-based adversarial feature selection, is based on the popular forward feature selection and backward feature elimination algorithms. The algorithm is tested in the spam detection scenario using a linear SVM classifier and in the PDF malware detection scenario using SVM with the RBF kernel. The algorithm produces relatively robust classifiers when subjected to gradient descent-based evasion attacks compared to the forward feature selection, backward feature selection, and adversarial backward feature selection algorithms. Kolcz and Teo [2009] use an approach to MCS that involves a feature reweighting step as an alternative to feature selection. In the reweighting step, the classifier is trained in two passes. In the first pass, the classifier (SVM or LR) is trained outputting feature weights. In the second pass, the classifier is retrained using feature weights inverse to the feature importance, derived from the weights output in the previous pass. When tested on spam email detection under GWI/BWO evasion attacks, an MCS built using 10 LR classifiers, differing by the included features (each has 50% of the total feature set), is shown to be able to withstand the attack to a higher degree than standard LR, a single reweighted LR, or fscale LR (a variant of a worst-case feature noise injection algorithm).
Game theory has been used to incorporate knowledge of attacker capability into learning algorithms. Broadly, the goal is to find an equilibrium representing the optimal strategy against the opponent (where no player benefits from deviating from the set of actions represented by the equilibrium). One such approach is to incorporate Stackleberg games, which are sequential games in which the follower (adversary) can observe and react to the leader's (learner) action. Brückner and Scheffer [2011] apply a Stackleberg prediction game to the field of spam email detection. The Stackleberg equilibrium is found using an optimization function. When tested on four email datasets, the approach is shown to outperform SVM, LR, and Nash logistic regression (NLR) in accurately identifying spam emails. In a static prediction game, the learner and adversary both act simultaneously, without prior information on the opponent's move. Brückner and Scheffer [2009] provide a method for finding the unique Nash equilibrium in a static game, focused on the email spam detection example. The equilibrium is found using a convex loss function. Brückner et al. [2012] revise the earlier work of Brückner and Scheffer [2009] to repair the theorem dictating under which conditions a unique Nash equilibrium for a game exists and develop NLR and Nash SVM (NSVM). When tested on email spam detection, the NLR and NSVM variants outperform the non-Nash variants. Bulò et al. [2016] extend this approach to incorporate randomization on behalf of the attacker. In this approach, player strategies are replaced with probability distributions defined over the strategy sets. As with NSVM, a Nash equilibrium is found, although the requirement for a unique equilibrium is relaxed. A randomized SVM classifier (RNashSVM) is produced with both a linear and RBF kernel. The approach is found to produce decision boundaries tight to the legitimate points, resulting in a more difficult task for the attacker, but increasing the amount of FPs. The linear approach is compared against standard SVM, NSVM, and InvarSVM [Teo et al. 2007] . When tested against handwritten digits, a spam detection dataset, and a PDF malware dataset, the approach is shown to perform well when not under attack in all cases (except for the PDF malware test) and is shown to be more robust to attack than traditional SVM and the two previous secure variants, requiring greater levels of modification on behalf of the attacker to provide similar levels of performance degradation.
A different approach is to incorporate attack data into the training set to increase classifier robustness. Biggio et al. [2011a] propose a system that addresses a lack of attack data for use in training by making use of a generative classifier and incorporating a model of the expected attack into the training phase. The technique is evaluated in two settings. First, it is evaluated in the biometric identity verification scenario, where the LLR fusion rule is extended with the model. The extended LLR is shown to be slightly less effective when compared to standard LLR when not under attack but achieves significantly better performance when under attack. The technique is also tested in the spam filtering case using a modified naive Bayes text classifier (as used in SpamBayes) against the GWI/BWO attack. The modified naive Bayes is shown to outperform the standard naive Bayes. In both cases, the defesce reduces the effect of the attack rather than provides complete protection.
Machine unlearning [Cao and Yang 2015 ] is a reactive approach that enables the defender to remove compromised (poisoned) data from a training set without having to retrain the classifier. This approach is effective as long as the defender knows what to unlearn. Therefore, the defender needs some form of attack detection in place.
Another common approach is to take an existing ML algorithm, and modify it to provide resilience to a particular adversary [Dalvi et al. 2004] , such as through retraining frequently. This approach is limited by the fact that it is an arms race between the defenders keeping the system up to date and attackers producing new attack variants.
Noise robustness techniques in ML have been around for several years. In the case of clustering, these techniques are generally focused on the handling of outliers or Gaussian noise [Chintalapudi and Kam 1998; Yang and Wu 2004; Li et al. 2007; Böhm et al. 2006] , whereas in the case of classification, the goal is to handle label noise [Biggio et al. 2011b; Bhattacharyya 2004; Denchev et al. 2012] . However, these techniques are focused on "naturally occurring" noise rather than adversarial noise, and thus the techniques are likely to be circumventable by the well-motivated attacker.
Of course, there are limitations to the mentioned defenses. In almost all cases, the defenses do not provide immunity to the discussed attacks. Although total immunity is impossible without already knowing the attack samples, the level of protection is often not enough. The usual result is that the effect of the attack is reduced, but the attacks can still be successfully performed, just with more effort on behalf of the attacker.
In almost all cases, the defenses are evaluated against a single attack with one or two limited datasets. Spam email detection is the motivating example in the majority of the defense papers mentioned earlier, with GWI/BWO attacks being common. The emails are usually converted into a bag-of-words feature vector made up of binary values. This evaluation methodology leaves two points to consider. What is the effectiveness of the defenses against further attacks? And how well will the defenses work in situations with far more complex, non-binary features such as in the case of malware C&C detection? There is a lack of evaluation in other security applications, such as C&C detection, where ML use is common. Part of this issue is left to the authors of detection systems themselves, as where they may evaluate with a few different ML algorithms, the set of algorithms will consist of nonsecure variants. Whereas spam detection and PDF malware detection (one of the other common use cases in the defense papers) both share similarities to some C&C detection systems, such as those performing analysis on packet payloads, others such as those focused on complex features like packet timings and malware behavior represent far more complex problems.
Some defenses, namely those based on game theory, rely on the attacker performing as expected by the attacker model. However, in reality, the attacker may not behave as expected (e.g., using the feedback of the learning algorithm to formulate future attacks) [Biggio et al. 2014b] . Probabilistic models such as those described in Biggio et al. [2011a] rely on an accurate prediction of the behavior of the attacker. However, as in any security problem, the attacker may orchestrate an attack that has not been considered.
Open Challenges
We combine the preceding into two key open challenges: -The clean slate design of ML techniques that incorporate considerations to an adversary are required, as opposed to adding layers on top of existing nonadversarial ML techniques. -Although in this survey we have focused on the detection step, a well-resourced attacker can also evade the measurement step when current sampling techniques are used . There is a need for the development of evasionresilient sampling techniques, such as ones for tuning measurement to respond to C&C detection to maximize the effectiveness of detection techniques.
CONCLUSION
Both academia and industry have been fighting malware C&C communication channels for close to a decade. From time to time, experts have proclaimed that the problem has been solved, only to find that their confidence has been misplaced due to subsequent attacks. With the wide deployment and support for signature-based techniques, first applied to intrusion detection, research has been focusing on applying ML techniques to C&C detection. Much of the detection effort has focused on traffic behavior that is not intrinsic to the functioning of the botnet. Consequently, C&C designers will find it trivial to bypass protections based on this assumption. We first observed attackers moving to decentralized architectures for the benefits of scalability and resilience. Now the attackers are adopting traffic analysis resistance techniques from anonymous communications literature. A second challenge is the scalable collection of traffic traces. Several of the detection systems discussed in this survey require full rather than sample data. With increasing traffic rates, it will soon become hard to store all traffic, thus forcing defenders to rely on estimation via sampling techniques. For certain data types, such as DNS logs, storing all of the data is easily achievable, whereas storing packet payloads is not scalable. Sampling in itself provides a possible method of evasion for the attacker-if the attacker can evade sampling, which may be a simpler task, he may evade detection no matter which ML algorithm is in use.
In light of these challenges, the problem of characterizing C&C traffic behavior from sampled traffic requires a shift of perspective. Researchers need to take a step back to focus on the big picture. First, the challenges of building secure measurement techniques have not received the necessary attention in the security communitythe "needle-in-the-haystack" problem is challenging, and some approaches have been outlined from sampling theory; however, these do not work in an adversarial setting. Apart from sampling techniques, the measurement architecture has to be open and extensible, allowing network-wide coordination to focus measurement resources on attack traffic rather than trying to work out broad trends as has historically occurred.
Next, there has been extensive research into the application of ML techniques while making some critical assumptions. First, existing techniques are too specialized, so it is hard to make a good case for deployment of these. Instead, we need a flexible extensible framework where an ensemble of detection algorithms can be activated as needed instead of operating many detection systems in parallel. Second, most existing techniques use static datasets, whereas detection techniques must operate on streaming data where fresh updates arrive every few minutes. Efficient techniques to update previous results with the new data are an important consideration for performance and hence deployment. Third, the use of robust ML techniques that can withstand variance and high dimensionality is very important. Although the research direction of applying learning theory is promising, existing application methodologies are fraught with error and open to mischance. Our analysis and summarization of current techniques show that performance and especially evasion resilience are the main barriers to wide adoption. We stress the significance of these properties in the real world to the security research community.
